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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the way in which stock-ﬂow matching
with endogenous seller entry generates hot and cold spells in house
sales. Potential sellers know the number of bidders remaining from
the last house sale. If two or more bidders remain, the seller obtains
the gains to trade through competitive bidding. The market is active.
With one monopolistic bidder, the buyer captures the surplus and
sellers become unwilling to enter. The market remains dormant until
sellers think enough time has passed for buyer entry to have replen-
ished the market and make entry proﬁtable. The resulting pattern of
trade matches up with observations from Wisconsin.
JEL Codes : R31, D53
KEYWORDS: trading volume, stock-ﬂow matching, house price dy-
namics
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1 Introduction
Housing, labor and other markets with trading frictions often appear to ex-
perience prolonged spells of high and low turnover. Although details vary
across markets and over time, the general ﬁnding is that during high volume
periods, prices are high and time to trade short. When turnover becomes
slack, prices are low if exchange occurs at all and traders spend a seemingly
long time on the market.1 As a result, prices and sales become variable,
contemporaneously correlated and persistent.
This paper demonstrates the way in which such distinct hot and cold
trading episodes can arise given a stock-ﬂow matching process and evaluates
the impact these ﬂuctuating spells have on the residential property mar-
ket. Stock-ﬂow matching (see Taylor, 1995; Coles and Smith, 1998; Coles
and Muthoo, 1998; Coles, 1999; Lagos, 2000; Gregg and Petrongolo, 2005)
assumes that buyers and sellers do not search randomly. Instead, market
participants have a good idea about where to look for suitable partners.
They check public and private intermediaries such as real estate agencies
and websites.
Although traders seek information about possible trading opportunities
using large scale intermediaries, they look for very speciﬁc characteristics in
their partners. Stock-ﬂow buyers and sellers are heterogeneous and trade in
distinct submarkets, diﬀerentiated by location and other characteristics in
which there are no trading frictions.2 In the housing market context, buyers
look exclusively for a combination of rooms, acreage, local amenities and so
on in a limited area. These submarkets are self-contained such that agents
can only trade within their assigned submarket.
As buyers and sellers come and go in each submarket, the population
ﬂuctuates stochastically so that traders can be on either the long or the short
side of their submarket. If lucky, an entrant is on the short side and ﬁnds
one or more options immediately available in their submarket. If the entrant
is unlucky and on the long side, there are no potential partners immediately
at hand. In the event that no partners currently exist in the submarket, the
entrant becomes a part of the stock or queue of traders on their side of the
1For housing market evidence, see Stein (1995), Muelbauer and Murphy (1997), Ortalo-
Magne and Rady (2006), Krainer (2008), Diaz and Jerez (2013), Ngai and Tenreyro (2014)
and Ngai and Sheedy (2015). Case and Shiller (1989) document persistence in prices.
2Stock-ﬂow also allows traders to submit multiple job applications as in Albrecht et al,
(2003) who consider a directed search model with multiple applications by job seekers.
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market and must wait to match from the ﬂow of new entrants on the other
side.3
The innovation introduced here is to allow endogenous seller entry.4 To
maintain a balanced market over time, the stock-ﬂow literature typically
assumes that buyers and sellers independently enter the market at the same
exogenous Poisson rate. In this paper, sellers have a higher arrival rate
than buyers but they have the option to decline the opportunity to enter
the market and save the associated sunk cost of participation. To illustrate,
consider a housing submarket in which buyers bid for available homes in
a public, complete information auction. Suppose a potential house seller
contemplates moving home or a developer weighs up the opportunity to build
a new home. In either case, the seller is considered relaxed. The seller is not
compelled or highly motivated to put a house on the market. Home owners
have the option to wait and consider moving later. Developers will come
across other opportunities in the future. If the seller knows that two or
more bidders are willing to make oﬀers, it will pay the cost of moving or of
building the house knowing that Bertrand bidding by the buyers will result
in the seller obtaining most of the gains to trade. On the other hand, with
one or zero bidders present, the seller will face a monopolistic buyer (either
immediately or in the future) who captures the majority of the gains to trade.
Entry does not occur in this case.
Sellers know the number of bidders, to some extent, from the previous
auction. If the were N bidders in the last auction, there must be at least
N − 1 for the next. As such, sellers will enter until only one known bidder
remains. The market then goes quiet and house sellers forgo the opportunity
to enter the market. As time passes, buyer entry will gradually replenish the
market. Assuming buyer entry is not revealed until the next auction is held,
the market remains dormant or fallow until sellers think enough time has
passed to make it proﬁtable to enter the market. When the market reopens,
if new buyer entry has not occurred, the lone bidder left at the last auction
pays a low price and the market becomes dormant again, even more so as
replenishing now requires not one but two buyers. If buyer entry occurred,
3Coles and Smith (1998) obtain compelling evidence in favor of this matching behavior.
See also Gregg and Petrongolo (2005), Andrews, Bradley and Upward (2001), Shimer
(2007), Coles and Petrongolo (2008) and Kuo and Smith (2009).
4Caplin and Leahy (2011) look at a related market and pricing structure but without
entry. Their baseline model does not match up as well with the empirical regularities as
the model analyzed in this paper.
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the bidders oﬀer high prices and entry remains active until the queue of
buyers dwindles down again.
This pattern of trade is ineﬃcient. When entry gets turned oﬀ with one
bidder known to be waiting, gains to trade are passed over. A monopoly bid-
der exists but prospective sellers do not respond. In the housing market, a
seller ﬁrst pays a sunk entry cost which may be thought of as the cost of mov-
ing or building the home. If entry were to occur, the monopoly bidder would
not compensate the seller for this sunk cost. Due to this hold-up problem,
the outcome during this fallow period is therefore ineﬃcient. Several factors
- the rate of buyer entry, housing costs - naturally determine the duration of
these active and inactive spells and hence the eﬃciency of the market.
Allowing for some exogenous entry enriches this framework. For a variety
of reasons, some sellers in the housing market might be highly motivated or
compelled to enter the market. Whether pushed by necessity or pulled by
very low costs to put their house up for sale, these entrants help further
shape the pattern of entry, the duration of these fallow and fertile spells,
the volume of trade and prices paid. Moreover, as such motivated sellers list
their homes for sale in submarkets without buyers, inventories build up.5
Simulations reveal that a rising proportion of motivated sellers increases
the duration relaxed sellers will wait before they enter and decreases the pay-
oﬀ to buyers faced with the choice to buy or wait through a cold spell without
trade. The model with both motivated and relaxed sellers also performs well
when compared with the housing market of Dane County, Wisconsin home
of the city of Madison. Variation, correlation and persistence in price, sales
volume, new listings, inventories and time on the market from the model do
well mimicking observed data. Moreover, data for Madison suggest hot and
cold spells are prevalent and such spells are commonplace in the simulations.
The cold spells in the model, however, under perform in generating the ob-
served dispersion of sales due to their apparent short duration, suggesting
omitted factors in the stylized trading speciﬁcation are needed to account for
sales dispersion.
5Albrecht et. al. (2007) adopt the relaxed and motivated terminology for these types
of traders in a model of the housing market with random matching and price bargaining.
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2 Model
Individual buyers enter a small, specialized, island-like submarket for an
indivisible good - a house or home - in continuous time at the constant
Poisson rate β > 0. There are two potential types of sellers. Relaxed or
discretionary sellers have the option to evaluate their prospects and decide
whether to enter the submarket. For example, a relaxed household might
like to trade up or to downsize their house but their immediate situation
allows them the patience to wait for the right moment to capitalize on their
sale. On the other hand, motivated sellers do not have any discretion. Their
particular circumstances compel them to automatically enter.
Relaxed sellers receive the opportunity to participate in the submarket at
the rate σ > 0. If a relaxed seller enters the submarket, the cost of entry is
F. Motivated sellers enter at rate 0 ≤ α < β such that α+σ > β.6 Since the
motivated sellers are compelled to entered the submarket, it is immaterial
whether they pay a sunk entry cost.
All agents are risk neutral - they maximize expected receipts - and dis-
count at rate r. Idle agents receive and make no payments. Any seller, relaxed
or motivated, who enters a submarket holds an auction for their good. An
accepted bid at price p yields a payoﬀ x − p to the buyer and revenue p to
the seller. After a trade takes place the consummating buyer and seller both
leave the market. Unsatisﬁed buyers and sellers remain behind to wait for
the next trading opportunity.
Buyers and motivated sellers always participate whereas discretionary
sellers choose to take advantage of an opportunity or not. Before entry occurs,
a relaxed seller who receives an opportunity to trade knows the outcome of
the previous auction, including the number of bidders and the date of the
auction. This seller, however, does not know the outcome of buyer entry over
the period since the last auction. Thus, at any given point in time, relaxed
sellers who obtain an opportunity to enter a submarket decide whether to
accept or decline this opportunity based on the number of bidders remaining
from the last auction in that submarket as well as the duration since that
event. On the other hand, a new relaxed seller contemplating entry observes
whether there are existing homes for sale, that is any unsatisﬁed prior sellers
6Without a relaxed seller entry decision, the model is balanced if and only if α = β
and σ = 0 which is the assumed condition in the stock-ﬂow literature. The alternative
extreme case in which all buyers are relaxed (α = 0) is strightforward to consider and also
yields hot cold spells.
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who entered and did not sell, in a submarket.
Once entry occurs, there are no impediments to trade. Agents are per-
fectly informed about submarket conditions.
ASSERTION: Immediate trade occurs so that the submarket never simulta-
neously has unsatisﬁed buyers and unsatisﬁed sellers.
See Coles and Muthoo (1999) for a discussion of this assertion.
2.1 Hot and Cold Submarkets
In cold or dormant submarkets, relaxed home sellers with an entry option
decline the opportunity to participate thereby saving the fee F . These sellers
are waiting for buyer entry to replenish the pool of buyers and revitalize
submarket entry.
Since buyer entry follows a known underlying Poisson process that is
unobserved by sellers, the transition to an active or hot submarket can come
in one of two ways. A motivated seller can enter automatically and trigger an
auction. The outcome of this auction reveals the number of buyers who have
entered during the cold phase of the submarket and hence resets the entry
decision of potential relaxed sellers. If a suﬃcient number of bidders appear
in the auction, the submarket entry of relaxed sellers becomes active. If not,
the waiting decision resets itself to the beginning of the cold phase conditional
on the number of bidders. If seller entry occurred but no sale followed, the
inventory of available homes builds up. In this case, the submarket remains
cold - no relaxed seller entry - until the stock of available homes is sold and
then followed by an appropriate cold period to replenish buyers.
The cold phase may also end after a period of complete submarket inactiv-
ity, that is after a suﬃciently long period without any motivated seller entry.
After some length of time, seller expectations of (unobserved) buyer entry
eventually improve enough to induce entry. These expectations and hence
the potential duration of inactivity depend on the outcome of the previous
auction, in particular the remaining number of bidders.
Now consider hot or active submarkets in which relaxed sellers accept the
option to enter the submarket. These hot submarkets will eventually turn
fallow once seller entry (which is faster than buyer entry) runs down the
stock of buyers and becomes no longer proﬁtable. Expected proﬁts from an
auction depend on the expected number of bidders found in the submarket.
Since buyers exit only after consummating a trade, the expected number
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of buyers depends on both the known number remaining from the previous
auction and subsequent entry since that auction.
Assuming that the submarket becomes less proﬁtable as the number of
bidders decline, a hot submarket becomes dormant immediately following an
auction with some threshold number of buyers. Directly after an auction,
the number of potential bidders is known with certainty. The submarket
will resume activity after a suﬃcient time elapses for expected turnover to
revitalize the submarket or for the entry of an motivated seller to reveal
suﬃcient buyer demand.
The previous auction may have any number of excess bidders from zero,
one, or more. Monopolistic bidding submarkets - those with one or zero
bidders left over from the last auction - allow buyers to capture most of
trade surplus. Since market power in these cases rests with buyers, these
submarkets are assumed to be cold. On the other hand, suppose that if
there are two or more bidders left over. These Bertrand competitors are on
the short side of their submarket once entry occurs and thus market power
resides with the seller. In this case, immediate entry (if available) is assumed
to be proﬁtable and the submarket is hot. Conditions on entry fee levels will
be derived below that deliver these assumptions.
2.2 Submarkets with Buyer Queues
Assuming that a suﬃciently strong expectation of monopolistic bidding de-
ters entry, a submarket becomes cold and dormant if the previous entrant
found zero, one or two bidders available for the auction. A prospective seller
knows that there exists one buyer right after an auction with two bidders
and that there are no bidders immediately following an auction with one or
zero bidders. Auctions without any bidders imply an excess supply of sellers
which is discussed later. This section ﬁrst discusses the submarket following
an auction with single seller and at least one bidder.
Buyer Payoﬀs
Let H(N) represent the payoﬀ to a home buyer from being in a hot,
active submarket where N ≥ 1 denotes the number of bidders (including the
buyer) in the submarket waiting for the arrival of a seller. If N = 1 and
entry occurs, the single bidder has monopoly power. For N ≥ 2, bidding
is competitive. Similarly, let C(N,T ) represented the expected payoﬀ to a
buyer in a cold submarket with N bidders who must wait a duration T before
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entry of relaxed sellers becomes viable again, i.e. the remaining duration
without any motivated seller entry before relaxed sellers with the option of
entry become willing to pay F to visit the submarket.
Let P (N) represent the price resulting from an auction with N ≥ 1
bidders. In the Bertrand pricing game with more than one buyer, buyers
bid prices up until the gains to trade from purchasing the currently available
good equal the payoﬀ of staying in the submarket and waiting for the next
auction. For N ≥ 2, the buyer is indiﬀerent between paying P (N) and
waiting for the next entrant, whether in a hot or cold submarket :
P (N) = x−H(N − 1) N ≥ 3
= x− C(1, T1) N = 2
where T1 represents the duration relaxed sellers will wait before entering given
there was one buyer in the submarket at the last auction when the submarket
became cold. P (1), the price paid when the submarket is balanced with one
buyer and one seller, is discussed below. With zero ﬂow costs from being
on the market after the entry fee, the seller accepts the highest non-negative
bid.
With probability αe−αtdt, a motivated seller enters the submarket during
the cold period after a duration t and triggers an auction with the existing
bidders and any other buyers who might have entered during the cold period
up to time t. In this environment, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ in a cold
submarket can be written as
C(N, T ) =
 T
0
αe−(r+α)t
∞
i=0
πi(t)[x− P (i+N)]dt (1)
+e−(r+α)T
∞
i=0
πi(T )H(i+N)
where πi(t) denotes the probability that i buyers enter the submarket after a
duration t in which case N+ i bidders await an incoming seller. Since buyers
enter at Poisson rate β, the probability of i entrants after duration t is given
by
πi(t) =
e−βt(βt)i
i!
Now consider the bidder payoﬀ in a hot submarket. Suppose the buyer
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is alone in the submarket. With a monopoly position (N = 1)7, the buyer
receives x − P (1) if seller entry occurs and H(2) if buyer entry occurs. Ac-
counting for arrival rates, this expected payoﬀ can be written as the linear
diﬀerence equation:
H(1) =
1
1 + rdt
[(α+ σ)dt(x− P (1)) + βdtH(2) + (1− (α+ σ + β)dt)H(1)] .
With one other bidder (N = 2), seller entry results in an auction that
will leave one known, unsatisﬁed bidder remaining for the next auction. This
outcome stops entry of relaxed sellers and leaves the unsatisﬁed bidder in a
cold submarket with expected payoﬀ C(1, T1). Since the successful bid with
two bidders leaves them indiﬀerent between buying and remaining, the payoﬀ
to a buyer in an active submarket with two bidders is given by
H(2) =
1
1 + rdt
[(α+ σ)dtC(1, T1) + βdtH(3) + (1− (α+ σ + β)dt)H(2)]
For N ≥ 3, competitive bidding makes buyers indiﬀerent between purchasing
and waiting for the next auction with one less competitor. Hence,
H(N) =
1
1 + rdt
[(α+ σ)dtH(N − 1)+
βdtH(N + 1) + (1− (α+ σ + β)dt)H(N)]
For N > 1, the solution to these diﬀerence equations is given by
H(N) = C(1, T1)η
N−1
where
η =
r + α+ σ + β − [(r + α+ σ + β)2 − 4(α+ σ)β]1/2
2β
After substituting for H(2) in H(1), the payoﬀ to a lone monopolistic buyer
in an active submarkets becomes
H(1) =
(α+ σ)(x− P (1)) + βηC(1, T1)
r + α+ σ + β
7With one bidder remaing from the previous auction (N = 1), a one bidder auction
can arise after entry of a motivated seller (and no buyer entry) or after entry of a relaxed
seller following a cold period in which no buyer entry occurred.
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Relaxed Seller Entry
Following a spell of duration t without seller entry, expected revenue less
the entry fee for a relaxed seller contemplating entry into the submarket with
N ≥ 1 bidders remaining from the last auction is given by
R(N, t) =
∞
i=0
πi(t)P (i+N)− F
Consider the monopolistic bidding cases. If one bidder remains from the
previous auction, then the expected revenue from entry is the expected sales
less the cost of entry. If zero new buyers have entered since the previous
auction, the monopolistic buyer bids the monopolistic price P (1). With two
bidders, the seller receives x−C(1, T1).With three or more bidders, the price
oﬀered and paid is P (i) = x−H(i − 1). Since πi(t) gives the probability of
observing i+ 1 bidders, expected proﬁt is given by
R(1, t) = π0(t)P (1) + π1(t)[x− C(1, T1)] +
∞
i=2
πi(t)[x−H(i)]− F
Substitution and manipulation yields
R(1, t) = e−βtP (1) + (1− e−βt)x+ e−β(1−η)t[1− e−βηt]C(1, T1)/η − F
Entry occurs if and only if R(1, t) ≥ 0 hence the critical duration of entry,
T1, for relaxed sellers aware of only one known bidder satisﬁes
x− e−βT1(x− P (1)) + e−β(1−η)T1 [1− e−βηT1 ]C(1, T1)/η − F = 0 (2)
A similar procedure reveals that revenue after a duration T0 following an
auction with zero bidders left over is given by
βe−βT0 [T0 + 1/(r + α+ β − αλ)]P (1) (3)
+(1− e−βT0 − βT0e
−βT0)x
+e−β(1−η)T0 [1− e−βηT0 − βηT0e
−βηT0 ]C(1, T1)/η
2 − F = 0
Firm entry is assumed for N ≥ 2. If entry occurs immediately after an
auction with N = 3 bidders, the entering sellers receives P (2) = x−C(1, T1).
The entry assumption thus holds provided entry cost is suﬃciently small, that
is if and only if
x− C(1, T1) ≥ F.
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2.3 Excess Sellers and Balanced Trade
Entry of motivated sellers occurs during both active and dormant submar-
kets. Even though motivated sellers enter at a slower rate than buyers, from
time to time the realization of the entry processes will be such that more
motivated sellers than buyers enter and cold submarkets will experience hav-
ing excess sellers. An inventory of unsold homes builds up. In addition, the
entry of relaxed sellers can cause an inventory of one seller. If the previous
auction had a single bidder and no entry of buyers or sellers occurs, even-
tually the submarket becomes active and a relaxed seller will enter but not
ﬁnd a bidder.
Relaxed sellers will not enter submarkets with excess supply until all
of the previous sellers who entered consummate trades. They observe all
unsatisﬁed trade and hence do not enter if another seller already exists in
the submarket. Motivated sellers, however, may enter to cause additional
excess supply. Really cold submarkets, those with excess sellers, remain cold
until balance is restored.
Like buyers in submarkets with excess bidders, sellers in submarkets with
excess goods accept bids that make them indiﬀerent between taking the bid
and waiting for the next auction. Since α alone governs the arrival rate
of motivated sellers, the payoﬀ to a lone seller in the submarket (M = 1)
awaiting for the arrival of buyer is given by
Z(1) =
1
1 + rdt
[αdtZ(2) + βdt P (1) + (1− αdt− βdt)Z(1)] .
With other sellers waiting the arrival of a buyer (M = 2), sellers are will-
ing to accept a bid that makes them indiﬀerent between selling and waiting
in the submarket, the payoﬀ to Z(M) is given by
Z(M) =
1
1 + rdt
[αdtZ(M + 1) + βdtZ(M − 1) + (1− αdt− βdt)Z(M)] .
The solution to these diﬀerence equations is given by
Z(M) = Z(1)λM−1
for M > 1, and
Z(1) =
βP (1)
r + α+ β − αλ
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where
λ =
r + α+ β − [(r + α+ β)2 − 4αβ]1/2
2α
From time to time, entry from one side or the other of the submarket will
occur such that the auction has one bidder and one seller. In this auction, the
buyer’s oﬀer again makes the seller indiﬀerent between waiting and accepting.
Given that buyer entry or seller entry will unbalance the submarket, the
equilibrium bid can be written as
P (1) =
1
1 + rdt
[αdtZ(1) + βdt [x− C(1, T1)] + (1− αdt− βdt)P (1)]
Substitution for Z(1) gives
P (1) =
β(r + α+ β − αλ)[x− C(1, T1)]
(r + α+ β)2 − αλ(r + α+ β)− αβ
(4)
3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of prices P (N) and accompanying entry decisions, T0
and T1, that terminate cold submarkets such that buyers and sellers willingly
trade whenever possible and relaxed seller entry is proﬁtable. If a buyer
and a seller are simultaneously present in a submarket, trade takes place
immediately at a price that makes the long side of the submarket indiﬀerent
between trading and waiting.
Two sets of diﬀerence equations emerge, H(N) for buyers and Z(M) for
sellers N,M = 1, 2, 3, .... Given the payoﬀ to waiting at the onset of a cold
submarket C(1, T1), these equations can be recursively solved. Prices P (N)
follow accordingly. Thus, equation (1) reduces to an implicit equation in
C(1, T1) and T :
C(1, T1) =

α(1− e−(r+α+β)T1)
r + α+ β
+
(α+ σ)e−(r+α+β)T1
r + α+ σ + β

(x− P (1)) (5)
+
α
η

1− e−(r+α+β(1−η))T1
r + α+ β(1− η)
−
1− e−(r+α+β)T1
r + α+ β

C(1, T1)
e−(r+α+β)T1

1− e−βηT1 +
βη
r + α+ σ + β

C(1, T1)
where (4) reveals that X − P (1) is a linear function of C(1, T1). The entry
decisions of relaxed sellers, captured through T1 and T0 and encapsulated
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in (2) and (3) depend on expected revenue from these prices and buyer en-
try. Since equation(2) contains only C(1, T1) and T1 (along with exogenous
parameters) an equilibrium follows from a positive solution of equations (2)
and (5) in these two unknowns. Equation (3) then gives T0. The payoﬀs and
prices follow accordingly.
Equilibria with hot and cold cycles are ineﬃcient due to a familiar hold
up problem.8 With one buyer known to exist in the submarket (N = 1), a
social planner would want entry. Otherwise, there are unexploited gains to
trade. Declined entry by relaxed sellers during a T1 cold spell is therefore
suboptimal and due to the inability of relaxed sellers to recoup the sunk costs
of entry. When there are no known buyers in the submarket (N = 0), entry
may or may not be eﬃcient. If no known buyer exists, relaxed seller entry
has a positive return if and only if
∞
i=1
πi(t)x > F
which simpliﬁes to
t >
ln[1− F/x]
β
Analytic solutions are in general unavailable so it is hard to compare this
ﬁgure to T0. Simulations reveal the unsurprising result that T0 is generally
greater than the planner’s solution.
Simulated results also help gauge the impact of the composition of seller
types. Queues in each submarket wax and wane with the arrival of buy-
ers and sellers, both voluntary and involuntary. The composition of relaxed
and motivated sellers, which reﬂects the economic context, thus aﬀects eco-
nomic performance. For example, cities diﬀer in the range and number of
jobs available. If the willingness of a home owner to sell is linked with job
opportunities within and across cities, housing markets will contain diﬀerent
numbers of motivated sellers.
8It is possible to establish an equilibrium exists with T0 > T1 > 0. The cumbersome
algebra involved with characterizing the two equations in two unknowns is unexceptional
and omitted here.
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Table 1. Composition of Relaxed and Motivated Sellers
α 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
α/(α+ σ) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Fallow Intervals
T1 9.96 9.99 10.03 10.05 10.08 10.10
T0 30.95 31.28 31.62 31.97 32.32 32.66
C(1, T1) 0.245 0.217 0.190 0.163 0.138 0.112
Summary Statistics
Average Price 0.751 0.734 0.686 0.581 0.384 0.085
Average Sales 223 224 225 224 226 226
Average Inventory 26 29 40 87 323 2, 018
Relative S.D. σq/σp 3.407 3.041 1.938 1.347 0.593 0.320
Correlation σp,q 0.493 0.351 0.319 0.258 −0.0857 0.1045
Persistence ρ
−1 0.269 0.112 0.386 0.331 0.547 0.598
Table 1 lists basic statistics for a simulated market - details are pro-
vided below - for varying values of α, keeping the total entry rate of sellers,
α + σ = 2β, constant.9 The lengths of cold spells, measured by T1 and T0,
increase with α. A lower expected utility C(1, T ) of a buyer waiting in the
submarket at the start of a cold period accompanies these increased dura-
tions. As the proportion of exogenous entry increases, the contribution of T1
and T0 to the actual duration of cold spells and the pattern of trade changes.
Realized periods without relaxed entry also depend on the outcome following
automatic entry. When the entry of a motivated seller reveals a buyer queue,
relaxed seller entry is switched on. A motivated seller that reveals a dearth
of buyers resets and prolongs the absence of relaxed entry.
As motivated sellers become more prevalent, fewer buyers wait in queues.
Indeed, as motivated sellers becomes highly likely, many of the homes for sale
from motivated sellers appear to wind up on the other side of the market in
9Given the restriction that α < β, it must be the case that α/(α + σ) is less the
a half so the last column is calculated using a value just below α = 0.05. This has no
apparent impact on the results but this speciﬁcation is not equivalent to the standard
exogenous, balanced entry model as σ = 0.05 and not zero. The other parameters for
Table 1 simulations are the same as those used below with one exception. In order to keep
have sellers willing to trade with two buyers, the interest rate for Table 1 is increased from
r = 0.025 to r = 0.035.
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long queues. As a result, the average price of a home in Table 1 declines
considerably whereas the average quantity sold for the most part does not
vary substantially. Average sales are ultimately tied to the average number
of buyers determined by β. Average inventories unsurprisingly rise as more
sellers enter exogenously. These ﬁgures together suggest that the net eﬀect
of less relaxed entry and a higher proportion of motivated sellers will result
in more advantageous trade for the buyers. Without further analysis on
the distribution across submarkets, however, it is inconclusive whether these
submarkets necessarily experience smoother trading and shorter dormant
periods.
Table 1 also presents dispersion, correlation and persistence statistics.
For very low values of α, sales are roughly three time more variable than
prices (σq/σp) but become relatively less variable as the proportion of mo-
tivated sellers increases. The contemporaneous co-movement of price and
sales (σp,q) also generally declines as motivated sellers become more com-
monplace. As motivated sellers become the norm (high α with long seller
queues in some submarkets), the average price is very low and displays vir-
tually no connection with quantity sold across all submarkets. On the other
hand, price persistence (lagged one period and denoted by ρ
−1) occurs for all
mixtures of relaxed and motivated sellers and exhibits a general U-shape as
this proportion increases.
4 Benchmark Evidence
To establish an empirical benchmark, this section presents commonly used
housing market statistics from Dane County, Wisconsin (pop. 426,526 in
2000). Approximately half the population of Dane County lives in the city of
Madison. The South Central Wisconsin Multiple Listing Service (SCWMLS)
provides monthly data on average prices, sales, new listings and end of month
inventory of unsold homes from January 1997 onwards. The SCWMLS also
lists average time on market for unsold inventory until December 2002. To
bypass the upheaval of the 2008 recession, the sample considers these series
until December 2007.
Table 1 presents the mean values of these variables (in levels) along with
their minimum and maximum values. To facilitate comparison with a sta-
tionary model, Table 1 also presents the standard deviation of their logged,
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detrended and seasonally adjusted values.10 As seen in Table 1, the varia-
tion in sales over this period is approximately two and a half times higher
than the variation in price and nearly identical to the variation in listings.
Inventory exhibits the most variation over time. The standard deviation in
time on market lies between the variation of price and sales but this ﬁgure
is derived from far fewer observations.
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations
Dane County SCWMLS Data | Model
Mean Min Max Std Dev N | Mean Std Dev
Price 209,258 116,674 292,462 0.047 132 | 0.0285
Sales 423 157 792 0.114 132 | 225 0.0617
Listings 636 238 1241 0.119 132 | 225 0.0634
Inventory 1847 1228 3118 0.241 132 | 29 0.1793
Time on market 66 42 98 0.081 72 | 21 0.3477
Notes : SCWMLS data in italics. Simulated data in bold face
The lower diagonal half of Table 2 reports the observed contemporaneous
correlations among these (logged, detrended and seasonally adjusted) vari-
ables. Table 3 contains monthly autocorrelations. From the lower half of
Table 2, price exhibits positive correlation with sales and with listings. This
price-sales correlation is lower in Dane County than found elsewhere from
more aggregated, longer but less frequent, and sometimes trending series.11
The correlations of price with inventory and of price with time on market
are both negative but weak. All ﬁgures involving time on market presented
here should, however, be viewed cautiously given the relatively low number
of observations from just six years. Several authors document and empha-
size a robust negative relationship between price and time on market or with
time to sell.12 Krainer (2008), Díaz and Jerez (2013) and Ngai and Sheedy
10OLS regressions with a linear trend and monthly dummies are used to detrend and
seasonally adjust all logged variables. The general picture of relative standard deviations is
similar but less pronounced when the variables are not detrended and seasonally adjusted.
11See Stein (1995), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Diaz and Jerez (2013) and Ngai and
Sheedy (2015). An exception is Head et al (2014) with a negative price-sales relationship.
12Average time on market, which measures the average duration a home in the unsold
stock available has been on the market, diﬀers from the average time to sell, which measures
how long a house took to sell among the ﬂow of houses leaving the market.
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(2015) describe negative price-duration correlations linked with hot and cold
markets.
Sales and inventory are inversely related whereas listings and inventory
correlate positively and prominently. Given that sales and new listings are
weakly correlated, the new listing-inventory relationship makes basic ac-
counting sense. If sales (or new listings) surge, inventory will drop (rise)
without a contemporaneous surge in new homes listed for sale (sold). On the
other hand, the weak link between sales and new listings appears somewhat
at odds with the stock-ﬂow interpretation of trade. The frequency of the
SCWMLS data may play a role in depressing observed sales-new listings co-
movements. If it takes a few weeks between agreeing to exchange and actually
completing the deal rather than sales occurring instantaneously, the observed
link between sales and the ﬂow of new homes for sales will be depressed in
monthly data.
Table 3. Correlation Coeﬃcients
Price Sales Listings Inventory Time on Market
Price 1.0 0.5769 0.6405 -0.2981 -0.2767
Sales 0.2188 1.0 0.9272 -0.5800 0.2229
Listings 0.2665 .1026 1.0 -0.5139 0.0072
Inventory -0.0921 -0.4264 0.5677 1.0 -0.3433
Time on market -0.0851 0.3222 0.2739 0.0537 1.0
Notes : SCWMLS data in italics. Simulated data in bold face
As documented in Table 3, persistence is positive for both prices and
sales with a more pronounced and enduring pattern in sales than in prices.
Caplin and Leahy (2011) emphasize the inverse relationship between the
inventory of homes for sale and future prices.13 The third column of Table 3
therefore reports the correlations for price and lagged inventory. Consistent
with Caplin and Leahy, this relationship is negative in Dane County. It
begins modestly after a month and increases with duration of the lagged
inventory.
13On the other hand Diaz and Jerez (2013) very weak support for a link between prices
and lagged inventory.
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Table 4. Autocorrelations
Price Sales Price-Inventory
L(-1) 0.3318 0.5106 -0.1112
L(-2) 0.2748 0.4310 -0.1330
L(-3) 0.3078 0.5181 -0.1761
L(-4) 0.2661 0.3663 -0.2115
L(-5) 0.2420 0.2910 -0.2292
L(-6) 0.3258 0.2165 -0.2653
L(-12) 0.1301 0.2584 -0.3847
–––––––––––––
Model L(-1) 0.3765 0.2209 -0.3174
Notes : SCWMLS data in italics. Simulated data in bold face
This picture of home sales in Dane county is generally consistent with the
evidence emphasized in the literature. In Dane and elsewhere
• sales vary more than prices
• prices correlate with contemporaneous sales
• prices and sales exhibit persistence
• prices are negatively correlated with lagged inventory
The notable anomaly in Dane County is the absence of a strong inverse link
between price and time on market which as noted may be due to small sample
size.
Before comparing this picture with the performance of the model, it
is worth looking further into the underlying data for Madison. Hendel et
al (2009) and Ortalo-Magné (2011) use the raw data generating the Dane
County series for the period 1998-2005 to assess the housing market in Madi-
son. Ortalo-Magné (2011) looks in detail at a particular homogeneous sub-
market in Madison - large houses in a single elementary school district -
which conforms closely to the speciﬁcation of a submarket in this paper.
Figure 1 reproduces Ortalo-Magne’s observations of price premia14 and the
number of available houses on the market during the period January 1999
14The price premium is the ratio of the transaction price to a hedonic regression adjusted
price minus one.
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Figure 1:
until December 2004. Viewed through the stock-ﬂow model of trade, this
plot is intriguing. Two episodes stand out given the focus on hot and cold
spells. Between December 2000 and December 2001, the Ortalo-Magné ﬁgure
displays only two price premia both of which occur shortly after the addition
of a new home for sale, one after a month and the other after two months.
It looks as if a seller entered a cold market and was able to sell to an eager
buyer. In the eight months between July 2001 and March 2002, no sales
appear to take place. In the second episode from September 2003 until Jan-
uary 2005, again only two price premia appear. Within this period, no sales
take place in the ten months between September 2003 and June 2004 during
which time two house were added to the inventory for sale. It looks as if in
this instance sellers entered during a dry patch in turnover but did not ﬁnd
a buyer willing to trade quickly.
Hendel et al (2009) look at individual prices and sales across all sub-
markets in Madison. It is possible to inspect their data for January 1999-
December 2005 for hot and cold spells. Most of the observed homes sold
belong to ﬁve distinct quality classes. There are 29 identiﬁable elementary
school districts. Adopting a quality class of home in an elementary school
district approach as in Ortalo-Magné (2011), there are potential 145 submar-
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kets. Some elementary districts do not have homes of all ﬁve quality classes.
Eliminating the quality class × elementary submarkets with no sales leaves
139 diﬀerent sized submarkets as determined by average sales.
A memoryless Poisson process for sales over time would not exhibit hot
or cold spells but would generate a distribution of sales in which the mean
equals the variance. Table 4 therefore reports the average and maximum
number of sales for each month along with the standard deviation across
markets. Unsurprisingly, June and July are the busiest months and January
and February the slowest.15 Although the size of these markets varies across
markets and with time, the high degree of variation in sales suggests hot
and cold spells exists. A more explicit test derives from a negative binomial
regression which nests the memoryless Poisson model. Given month, year,
quality class and average market size controls, the speciﬁcation test rejects
the Poisson speciﬁcation (N = 11, 676, χ2 = 2482.42). The Poisson speciﬁca-
tion is also rejected using a wide variety of more homogeneous subsamples.
Restricting attention to submarkets within a quarter standard deviation of
the mean sales and looking at sales for June and July, the test statistic is
χ2 = 18.27 with N = 476.
A simple graphic approach illustrates the same excessive variation. The
top panel in Figure 2 graphs the distribution of sales in June and July for
submarkets within a quarter of a standard deviation of the mean number of
sales. A Poisson distribution with the same average sales is graphed in the
middle panel. This ﬁgure reveals an overabundance of no sales and of a high
number of sales. Stated simply, there is too much variation for a market
which does not experience hot and cold spells.
15Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) investigate this seasonality component.
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Table 5. Average Monthly Submarket Sales
Mean Standard Deviation Max
January 0.7133 1.3190 13
February 0.8582 1.6557 17
March 1.1840 2.2144 31
April 1.4573 2.4032 25
May 1.8335 2.9213 25
June 2.1891 3.4161 32
July 2.1244 3.1691 28
August 1.7955 2.7615 21
September 1.2508 1.9774 16
October 1.1716 1.9606 19
November 0.9764 1.6312 14
December 1.0349 1.7510 13
–––––––––––––––
Average 1.3820 2.4010 32
5 Simulated Outcomes
To numerically simulate the model suppose there are N = 150 identical but
isolated submarkets in which buyers and sellers arrive according to indepen-
dent continuous time Poisson processes. Let the daily arrival rate of buyers
in each submarket be
β = 0.05
which implies a buyer arrives on average once every 20 days. Over a month,
this rate (1.5) is marginally higher than the average (1.4) for the quality
class× elementary school submarkets in Madison. When a new buyer arrives,
either trade with an existing seller in the submarket occurs immediately after
entry or the queue of potential buyers in the submarket increases by one.
Assume potential sellers arrive at twice the buyer rate, α + σ = 2β. Let
one in every eight potential sellers be (α) motivated or compelled to sell so
that
α = β/4 = 0.0125;
σ = 2β − α = 0.0875.
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Figure 2: Sales Distributions
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When new, unmotivated (σ) sellers arrive, they ﬁrst decide whether or not to
enter the submarket based on the number of traders at the last transaction.
If entry occurs, again either trade with an existing buyer occurs immediately
or the queue of potential sellers increases by one.
The buyer’s utility to owning a home is normalized to one and the sunk
cost to a relaxed seller is three fourths this value :
x = 1
F = .75.
The discount rate
r = 0.025
is set high in part to account for the many costs of trading homes abstracted
away in the model. The high rate of time preference also plays a critical
role in yielding a buyer payoﬀ at the start of a cold market that satisﬁes
the assumption in the model that sellers are willing to trade with just two
bidders x− F > C(1, T ).
The six parameters (α, β, σ, x, F, r) describe the submarket. Numerically
solving for the endogenous variables gives
T1 = 9.11
T0 = 29.38
C(1, T ) = 0.2479
The duration of a cold spell with one known buyer in a submarket is a little
less than a week and a half. The duration of a cold spell when there are
no known buyers is about one month. Although neither spell lasts very
long, they are long enough to replenish the submarket. Given β = 0.05,
the probability that at least one new buyer arrives after a T1 spell is more
than one third (0.3659). After a duration of T0, the probability that there
will be two or more buyers equals 0.4317 whereas the probability of at least
one buyer is more than three quarters (0.7698). As a result, sellers with the
option of entry will infrequently ﬁnd themselves without at least one buyer
and therefore the stock of unsold homes derives primarily from motivated
sellers entering cold markets.
Poisson arrival rates imply that the associated waiting times between
buyers and sellers are distributed exponentially so that more than one trade
does not take place at any one instance. The organization of simulated
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events, however, reﬂects observed data in that events are recorded in discrete
intervals during which more than one sale can occur. In particular, the model
is simulated for 240 intervals or discrete periods of 30 days each. The ﬁrst
100 periods are dropped. Summing over the month and over submarkets
yields marketwide monthly average prices, total sales, new listings, inventory
of unsold homes and time on the market.
To begin evaluating the performance of the model against the SCWMLS
benchmark, the last column in Table 1 reports the means and standard devi-
ations in the simulated data. The arrival rate of buyers was chosen to realize
the approximate number of sales in Madison which as noted is half the size of
Dane County. New listings, inventory and time on market are all lower than
the observed data as are the standard deviations of these simulated statistics.
Missing factors in the model potentially account for this discrepancy. The
more relevant and fundamental point is that the relative variations compare
well with the data. As observed in Dane County, the simulated standard
deviation in price is less than half the standard deviation in sales. Díaz and
Jerez (2013) and Ngai and Sheedy (2015) report similar relative magnitudes.
The rankings and ratios for variation of new listings and inventory are like-
wise reasonable.16 The exception is the variation in time on market which
displays much higher dispersion in the simulated data than in the limited
SCWMLS data. Díaz and Jerez (2013) ﬁnd that the time on market varia-
tion is four times the price variation. Ngai and Sheedy (2015) ﬁnd that time
to sale - a diﬀerent but related measure - is twice the price variation.
Correlations and persistence are critical in evaluating the model. The
upper diagonal half of Table 2 and the bottom row of Table 3 report the con-
temporaneous and one month autocorrelations from the simulations. Given
the limited number of parameters, the pattern of correlations from the model
ﬁts well. The model, in particular, ﬁts two important stylized facts empha-
sized in the literature - the co-movement in price and sales and their persis-
tence. The simulations also yield the inverse price-lagged inventory relation-
ship highlighted by Caplin and Leahy (2011).17 Except for the persistence
16Ngai and Sheedy (2015) report several ﬁgures similar to the ones reported here. Using
seasonally adjusted, trending quarterly data, they ﬁnd new listings are more volatile than
sales whereas the Dane County and model ﬁgures are very close. Ngai and Sheedy also
report time to sell (not time on market) and new listings ﬁgures constructed observed sales
and inventories. Diaz and Jerez (2013) also present a number of overlapping measures
based on ﬁltered, quarterly ﬁgures.
17In their baseline model which shares aspects of this model but does not have hot and
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in sales, the simulated correlations for price and sales tend to be higher than
SCWMLS correlations which themselves tend to be below ﬁgures reported
elsewhere. Indeed, in most cases, the simulations generally exhibit stronger
correlations than observed in Dane County which may in part reﬂect the
impact of detrending and seasonally adjusting the SCWMLS data.
An important relationship emphasized in the literature is the link between
price and time on market. Here the model diﬀers from the SCWMLS data.
In the model the correlation is negative and prominent but weakly negative
in Dane County data. Again, time on market in the SCWMLS is calculated
using a short time period. Moreover, as noted above, the absence of this co-
movement in the SCWMLS data is out of line with the relationship obtained
elsewhere. The pronounced inverse relationship in the simulations conforms
with evidence of a strong inverse relationship perceived as stylized fact. See
Ngai and Sheedy (2015), Díaz and Jerez (2013), Krainer (2008), Novy-Marx
(2009).
The results discussed so far match the key components highlighted in the
previous section. Correlations involving sales, new listings and inventories
in the simulated data also deserve consideration. Inventories are inversely
related to price in the model and in the data as one might plausibly anticipate
when many sellers are waiting for buyers. In the model, new listings correlate
very closely with sales and closely with price. In the SCWMLS data, however,
new listings and sales correlate very weakly whereas new listings and price
exhibit less co-movement than in the model. In the model a new listing
will often result in an immediate sale (and frequently with more than one
bidder) thereby generating the strong positive co-movements. The decision
to enter rests on a high probability of a sale in a competitive auction. In the
model, the sale occurs immediately hence the tight link between new listings
and sales. In practice, it takes time to carry out a home sale and such
delays potentially generate such a discrepancy even if the model captures
the essential trading process. Using quarterly data Ngai and Sheedy (2015)
report correlations of 0.602 and 0.850 for new listings with price and with
sales respectively which match up well with the model. Moreover, when the
listing does not sell immediately, sales are lower so inventory rises. In both
the data and the simulations, inventory and sales are inversely correlated
with similar magnitudes.
cold spells, Caplin and Leahy are unable to explain positive autocorrelation in prices or a
negative correlation between price and lagged inventory.
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Now consider new listings and inventory which are positively correlated
in the data but negatively in the simulations. In the model, if inventories
become high, many submarkets will experience cold spells without relaxed
seller entry, hence the negative co-movement between listings and inventory.
Cold spells accompanying high inventories and low entry will have lower sales
thereby contributing to the negative inventory-sales relationship. In practice,
sales do not correlate - at least immediately - with listings as in the model,
which, as discussed in the previous section, yields a more direct accounting
relationship driving the observed listings-inventory data.
The relationships between time on market and the non-price variables in
the model involve a number of interactions that also deserve discussion even
if the time on market from the SCWMLS data is limited. To organize ideas,
ﬁrst suppose inventories are below average indicating there are relatively few
submarkets experiencing cold spells of declined entry. New listings will tend
to be high as relaxed buyers are more likely to enter. Sales too will tend
to be above normal but these sales will not greatly aﬀect time on market.
Sales of homes that occur immediately after seller entry have no eﬀect on the
time on the market as these homes come and go without eﬀect. Likewise, a
sale from the existing stock of homes does not lower the average time on the
market. If such a sale is a random selection, it removes an average duration
home and hence has no immediate impact on the average time on the market.
After the sale, however, average time on market in existing stock continues
to increase. If new listings from entry of relaxed sellers are high due to low
inventories and resulting sales are high, time on market can still rise and
result in a positive and non-negligible sales-time on market co-movement as
observed in the simulated as well as in the SCWMLS data.18
Now suppose inventories of unsold homes are high which will deter entry
of many relaxed sellers. A composition eﬀect from the exogenous motivated
seller entry potentially explains the inventory-time on market inverse co-
movement found in the model. Average time on the market falls (or rises
more slowly) as new listings from such sellers do not ﬁnd a existing buyer
and are added to the stock of homes for sale. As entry without an immediate
sale is essentially exogenous and scattered across all submarkets, it is more
common when inventories are high. With an above normal number of unsold
18Here the distinction between time on market and time to sale might be particularly
relevant. Ngai and Sheedy (2015) ﬁnd a strong strong negative link between new listings
and time to sell. They further report very little correlation between inventories and new
listings.
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homes, new listings by motivated sellers become more likely not to sell im-
mediately driving down average time on market. The process in the observed
data may be more involved as actual trade takes some time and new listings
that sell quickly are sometimes around long enough to aﬀect time on market
as well as inventory measures.
Given that there are only six parameters with one (x) normalized and
another (β) chosen to match the mean number of sales, the variation, corre-
lation and persistence in the model compare favorably to benchmark data.
On the other hand, dispersion in sales across submarkets, despite frequent
cold spells of no entry, does match the Madison quality class × elementary
school dispersion. The bottom panel of Figure 2 displays the distribution
of sales across submarkets. Relative to the SCWMLS data, there are not
only too few large sale months but also too few months with zero sales. Yet
submarkets frequently go cold. The proportion of months that experience at
least one relaxed seller not entering during a T1 cold spell is 0.2037. The pro-
portion for T0 spells is 0.4291. Although declined entry slows the transition
from one to no homes for sale, when the transition to zero inventory occurs,
the ensuing absence of willing entrants lasts longer and typically spans two
diﬀerent months.
Cold spells are essentially too short to accumulate enough potential buy-
ers to trigger the observed within month sales dispersion. Sellers, either
motivated or relaxed, enter quickly after slow periods so that large numbers
of buyers for sustained high frequency sales volume rarely accumulate. Like-
wise, cold spells are over and potential entry revived too quickly to create
enough months without a sale. As a result, the structure of the model leads
to a high number of months with just one sale.
Although the spell lengths are not highly elastic, parameters can be found
to enhance the length of T1 and T0. More enduring cold spells come at the
cost of extreme parameter values and a less convincing qualitative and quan-
titative correspondence with the data. An alternative approach inducing
more protracted cold spells would be to incorporate aspects of the housing
market currently unaccounted for in the model. For example, risk aversion,
spillovers and mobility across submarkets, trading frictions, search/waiting
and transaction costs, taxes, idiosyncratic or heterogeneous buyer prefer-
ences, dispersion in seller costs F, counter-oﬀer bargaining and the rental
market are all abstracted factors that potentially further delay seller entry.
Similarly, as the simulated buyers value function is close to deterring relaxed
entry ( x− F ≈ C(1, T1)), it may also be the case that sellers without a sale
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likely need more than one bidder for proﬁtable entry.19 The list is varied, the
implications diverse and incorporating many of these factors will undermine
transparency and tractability.
6 Conclusion
Proﬁt attracts entry. In perfectly competitive markets with full informa-
tion, instantaneous erosion pins down the timing and number of entrants as
well as the price and quantity sold. In markets with frictions, entry and
the subsequent pattern of trade may not be as immediate or straightforward.
Depending on market structure, it may take time to uncover proﬁtable oppor-
tunities which in turn aﬀects the ability and willingness of agents to exchange
goods and services.
This paper investigates the way in which entry of this sort aﬀects hous-
ing markets with stock-ﬂow matching. Home buyers compete in complete
information auctions for homes brought to market one by one. To attract
home seller entry, there must be suﬃcient competition among these bidders.
Bertrand-like oﬀers from two bidders are suﬃcient to induce entry. One
monopolistic buyer is not.
Given that house sellers can enter more rapidly than home buyers, mar-
kets will alternate between periods of inactive and active entry. In cold
markets, prospective sellers pass up production opportunities as they wait
for the (unobserved) arrival of buyers to replenish the market. Once they
think enough time has passed, entry resumes and reveals the proﬁts to be
made in the market. Seller entry continues until it exhausts the existing
demand.
The periods of inactivity with one willing but monopolistic bidder are
ineﬃcient. Gains to trade exist but are passed over because sellers do not
obtain a suﬃcient share of this payoﬀ. In particular, sellers will want an
upfront sunk cost which a monopolistic bidder cannot commit to paying
before entry takes place. With Bertrand numbers, buyers are compelled to
bid above the sunk cost making entry proﬁtable.
Depending on household circumstances, some sellers may be more com-
pelled to enter than others. The interactions between motivated and relaxed
sellers has a profound impact on the entry decision and subsequent trade.
The composition of relaxed and motivated sellers aﬀects the duration of hot
19Caplin and Leahy (2011) explore this possibility.
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and cold spells as well as the basic picture of trading patterns. Simulations
suggest that prices fall, relative volatility and co-movement with sales and
persistence remains constant as motivated sellers become more common.
Simulated outcomes with both types of sellers present also ﬁt empirical
evidence from Dane County, Wisconsin as well as stylized facts established
in the literature. With only a small number of parameters, the simulated
variation, correlation and persistence in price, sales volume, new listings,
inventories and time on market broadly match up well with the observed
data. The observed data are also consistent with the existence of having
hot and cold spells. Such spells frequently occur in the simulated model.
These cold spells are, however, not suﬃciently long enough to generate the
observed dispersion of sales. A number of omitted factors could potentially
extend the duration of these cold spells and thereby properly account for
sales dispersion.
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